PLANNING: A CONTINUUM OF UTOPIAN AND NON-UTOPIAN SENSIBILITIES

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INTRODUCTION

The identification of the origins of the intellectual history as well as the professional practice of planning, either in terms of its conceptual foundations or the chronology of events, takes one back to industrializing Europe and United States of the nineteenth century. In this period one can find both 'utopian' and 'anti-' or 'non-' utopian precursors of professional planning practice and planning theory of the twentieth century. This implies that neither set of precursors is the exclusive impetus behind the practice and the body of theory of planning; and this constitutes the main thesis of this essay (2).

UTOPIAN, ANTI-UTOPIAN AND NON-UTOPIAN SENSIBILITIES: IDENTIFICATION OF THE TERMS

It is necessary to understand utopian and anti-utopian (or better still, the non-utopian) elements, in order to understand the present condition as well as the historical development of planning thought and practice. This takes us to the identification of the utopian object and its anti-thesis, the anti-utopian object. According to Kumar both are:
contrast concepts, getting their meaning and significance from their mutual differences. But the relationship is not symmetrical or equal. The anti-utopia is formed by utopia, and feeds parasitically on it. It is utopia that provides the positive content to which anti-utopia makes the negative response. Anti-utopia draws its material from utopia and reassembles it in a manner that denies the affirmation of utopia (Kumar, 1987, 100).

Therefore, the identification of the utopian object would also give us clues for the identification of the anti-utopian object. The definition of the term utopia, however, is problematic in itself. A recent effort which sets out to clarify the meaning of the term and give a new definition to it can be followed in the work of Levitas (1990). Her analysis of utopian studies reveals that there is no agreement on a common definition of utopia. This is so, as she states, because of the fact that there are different ways of assessing its three fundamental aspects: content, form, and function. While some thinkers emphasize and focus on the content some others turn their attention to function or form. The absence of a common defining element, according to Levitas, is the central problem in reaching a common definition of utopia.

The definition of utopia through the analysis of its content tends to, first of all, become 'normative and evaluative', because it specifies what the good society would be, rather than reflecting on how it may be differently perceived (1990, 4). Secondly, such a definition again becomes problematic when the issue of possibility is considered. Contrary to the colloquial use of the term some thinkers try to assert that utopias are not impossible at all (3). That is, they think, utopias are realistic.

A descriptive definition, that is, a definition through the analysis of the form, on the other hand, is equally problematic for Levitas. Such definitions describe utopia as either an 'ideal commonwealth' or a 'good society', and do so by taking a utopia as a model on which the definition is built (4). Such an approach, according to Levitas, severely limits the definition of utopia:

Some commentators take the form of More's Utopia as a model and argue that utopia is a literary genre, involving the fictional depiction of an alternative society in some detail. However, depictions of the good society do not necessarily take the form of literary fictions, and indeed this form is only available under certain, very specific historical conditions; it is then to be assumed that when these conditions do not exist there are no utopias (Levitas, 1990, 5).

The answer to this question is undoubtedly negative (5). Not only descriptive definitions as such exclude one form of utopia or another from the definition but also disregard the historical change in the utopian form: one ideal commonwealth or good society of an epoch is indeed different than of another (6).

Some others, on the other hand, try to define utopia in terms of its function. This function can be best summarized as the presentation of some kind of goal. Yet, various thinkers have different opinions about this function. While, for example, Marx and Engels define utopia negatively in terms of its function (7), Mannheim (1960), whose position is very similar to that of Sorley (1925, cited in Levitas 1990), stands diametrically opposite to Marx and Engels in this respect. Mannheim (1960, 173) asserts that the fundamental function of utopia is to transform the status quo by transcending the reality.

While the ambiguity as to what constitutes a utopia is prevalent among other utopian studies, Levitas's quest for a common element which can be used for defining utopia seems to be fruitful. Drawing on Ernst Bloch, Herbert Marcuse
and William Morris, Levitas identifies this element as 'desire' (8). Thus, utopia becomes the expression of the desire for a better way of being:

This includes both the objective, institutional approach to utopia, and the subjective, experiential concern of disalienation (using the Marxist term). It allows for this desire to be realistic or unrealistic. It allows for the form, function and content to change over time. And it reminds us that, whatever we think of any set of conditions by reflecting upon the desires which those conditions generate and yet unfulfilled. For that is the space which utopia occupies (Levitas, 1990, 8; italics added) (9).

Levitas's 'desire' should not be understood only in Marxian terms, even though she is a Marxist. If, for the Marxist, this comes to mean the desire to attain the new state of disalienated beings through the abolition of capitalist relations, for the liberal-humanitarian the eternally happy being can be achieved through 'progress' in the same existing order of things and relations, without having to attempt to abolish these relations.

However, desire alone does not help attain and maintain this fundamental utopian end. According to Kateb (1963, 119), there generally exists a tendency for order in the utopian sensibility. The utopian tries to impose uniformity as well as preferring a known and stable future world. In such a world everything is known and everything happens in a calculated methodical way (10). The utopian thought, as such, and particularly in the nineteenth century, embodies a certain kind of means and ends rationality. This, on the other hand, gives way to the anti-utopian sensibility with the following imperatives:

1. Give up the vision of utopianism, though it may be a worthy vision, because there is no way to go from the real world to utopia; or if there is a way, it could be none other than the way of violence; and that is either too costly or too unreliable.
2. Give up the vision of utopianism, though it may be a worthy vision, because there is no way to insure the maintenance of its ends without an oppressive political regime.
3. Give up the vision of utopianism because the vision consists of ideals (assumed as permanent and universal) that are unacceptable; or though acceptable in the abstract, are, in fact, destructive of other, more worthy, ideals (Kateb, 1963, 18).

In addition to the literary works which feed on the fear of the utopian ends, the anti-utopian sentiment can also be traced in philosophical studies (11). Although anti-utopian sensibility is, in itself, full of inconsistencies as to which aspect of utopianism should be rejected, it nevertheless constitutes an opposition to utopianism both on theoretical and practical grounds.

I would like, at this point, to suggest that a distinction should be made between anti-utopian and non-utopian sensibilities. While the imperatives of the anti-utopian sensibility are given above, the non-utopian sensibility can be discerned by its pragmatic aspects. The non-utopian sensibility does not feed on the utopian sensibility as the anti-utopian sensibility. It should be understood as actions (and thoughts) to get things done or solve emerging problems within the context they emerge. Thus, the non-utopian sensibility neither opposes nor acknowledges any facet of utopianism. The here and the now constitute its realm of activities.

Under the light of this brief summary of different sensibilities, the roles of both sensibilities in planning theory and practice can be examined.
UTOPIAN AND NON-UTOPIAN ELEMENTS IN THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF PLANNING THEORY AND PRACTICE

As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, industrialization of the Western world was at full throttle and continued like that for more than a hundred years. The unprecedented effects of industrialization on the physical environment and social life inevitably gave rise to reactions or forced the authorities to take measures to mitigate and eliminate the unwanted effects. At the one end of the spectrum of reactions one can find the 'utopian socialists', the 'anarchists', and the 'Marxists'. Although different in their means, they all tried to establish the conceptual and practical basis of societies which would transcend the prevailing interrelations of politics, economics and culture of the period. There was a certain degree of desire to overcome the ill-effects of industrialization, though this never meant the rejection of industrial production itself, for industrial production meant abundance, a necessary factor in attaining and maintaining utopia.

The utopian socialists can be exemplified by Owen (1970; 1975), Fourier (1971; 1972), Saint Simon, Godin, and Cabet. Apart from Saint Simon, all utopian socialists set out to theorize about (and eventually to realize) self containing colonies which brought agricultural and industrial production together. The common and fundamental goal of their thought and practice was to set a moral example through these colonies. They thought that a rationally structured physical environment together with the abundance created by industry and agriculture would provide for the desired moral effect and thus help spread such colonies all over the land.

The anarchists, or social anarchists, saw the state as the major factor underlying the evils of the industrial society and thus began to theorize about its abolition. The means to establish the stateless society depended on various degrees of violence ranging from mass strike to sabotage. Sorel (1925), Proudhon (1970; 1979), Bakunin and Kropotkin (1975) were the protagonists of the emerging anarchist tradition.

Marx and Engels, being diametrically opposite to the anarchists, were for the centralization of the state, only this time by the rising of the proletariat to government.

It becomes tempting, therefore, to think that the origins of planning can be traced back to utopian socialists because they provided blueprints for a future society, and did so by rationally calculating the means and ends of their projects. However this would be a mistake.

It is a fact that all of the attempts set out by utopian socialists fell short of attaining the utopian end (Benevolo 1967; Hall 1988). The self supporting colonies of utopians went into oblivion, partly because of the mistakes embodied in their deterministic origins and partly because of the faulty assessments of the relationships between the economic, social and political factors of the period (some might prefer to say that 'time was not ripe'). The social anarchists and Marxists, on the other hand, while assessing the problematic relations of the industrial society, did not come up with such blueprints, partly because of the theoretical basis of their commitments which rejected such projects, and partly because of their preoccupation with the fundamental goal of transforming the status quo.
Meanwhile, attempts of the non-utopian kind, supervised and initiated by the states as well as the leading industrialists of industrializing nations, were made to mitigate the ills of industrialization. In England and France legislations and bills related to housing and sanitation were passed and put into action (Benevolo, 1967, 85-104; Smith, 1980). In Germany and Austria ‘town extension plans’, which aimed at the removal of old fortifications and reuse of the areas damaged by fire so as to provide relief for the congested cities (Breitling, 1980), were introduced. Industrialists started to establish workers’ settlements around their factories (Bollerey and Hartmann, 1980). Yet these were devoid of the social content envisaged by Owen. In the United States the major preoccupation at the close of the nineteenth century was the ‘White City’ of the City Beautiful ideology, through which the grandeur of a past epoch was hoped to be brought back (Wilson, 1980).

Perhaps, more importantly, the raison d’être of such movements, ideologies and actions was the failure of laissez-faire economics. Solutions to the emerging problems of industrialized nations could not be found in free market mechanisms.

All of the above, together with utopian socialism, social anarchism and Marxism, constitute the core of the origins of planning theory and practice, keeping in mind that they also had precedents (12). Using Friedmann’s terms, one can associate laissez-faire economics with ‘market rationality’, utopianism with ‘social rationality’, and non-utopian actions (and perhaps to a lesser extent anti-utopian thought) with a state of affairs which allows market rationality within given legal constraints (Friedmann, 1987, 19-21). This latter, rather curiously integrated kind of rationality, which, I think, embodies both utopian and non-utopian elements, provides for the philosophical frame-work of most of the developments in planning theory and practice of the twentieth century (13). This position can be justified by referring to at least two important cases in the history of planning. One of them is the Garden City Movement and the other is the development of the Regional Planning theory and practice. For the purpose of this essay, it is sufficient to outline the utopian and non-utopian elements in both cases and then examine their historical development in the predominantly market oriented societies.

When published in 1898 Howard’s To-Morrow (Howard, 1965) was already a work which brought together different strands of philosophies (Hall, 1988, 88-91). The non-utopian elements in his work can be summarized as follows. Firstly, he had a personal experience of the Homestead Act of 1862 which opened up the plains to pioneers free of charge and encouraged an educational system to sustain technical improvement in agriculture and machinery in the United States. Secondly, while visiting Chicago, known as the Garden City at the time, he is also said to have visited the Riverside suburb (14). Thirdly, Alfred Marshal, an economist, provided him with the idea that new technology would permit the dispersal of large classes of the population from metropolitan areas into the country (15). Those who move out of the cities and those who stay would both benefit from new technology. Fourthly, Herbert Spencer provided him with the idea of land nationalization; and Thomas Spence provided him with the idea of the collective purchase of farmland at a low price so that upon the construction of a town the increased values would return to the community who bought the farmland. These were the non-utopian ideas which provided Howard with the practical tools to get things done, so that he could attain his utopian ends and ideals.
The utopian elements in Howard's work can be traced back as follows. Firstly, from Edward Bellamy and Kropotkin he learned the impact of technological development on industrial location. Furthermore, these two favoured small scale workshops, which were an essential feature in Howard's layout for the Garden City. Secondly, from Owen, Buckingham, Ledoux, Pemberton and Kropotkin he borrowed the idea of surrounding his Garden City with agricultural greenbelts. Thirdly, again James S. Buckingham and his ideal city, Victoriana (Figure 1), provided him with a model for the scheme of his Garden City. Fourthly, but not the least important, More, Fourier and St. Simon provided him with the idea that cities should be perceived as elements belonging to a regional complex.

Howard's Garden City concept is based on such utopian and non-utopian elements. In the final analysis, however, one can observe that the whole idea is deeply rooted in the anarchist tradition and utopian socialism. Voluntarism, rejection of authority, freedom, social opportunity and cooperation, the final three of which appear in the last of his famous three magnets (Figure 2), point to this aspect of his idealism (not to mention his self-contained town-countries, which he thought could be spread by moral example).

Garden City was indeed a reaction to the industrial metropolis. It was an attempt to transcend the existing order of the capitalist relations of the industrial world. In the years to come, however, it was going to be stripped off its social features and used by non-utopian planners to ease the emerging housing shortages as well as to provide an alternative for the congested metropolis. At least, three different strands of planning activities can be followed in relation to this historical development and they are all interrelated. Garden-suburb (which was later developed into the Satellite Town concept by Raymond Unwin), Newtowns and Greenbelt Towns are all non-utopian projects. They are planned and even subsidized by local and central authorities (This is not to say that they are non-utopian because there is a state intervention, but because they do not reflect the social rationality of a utopian project).

The development of regional planning follows a similar trend. That is, it contains both utopian and non-utopian elements which affected its historical evolution. Even the identification of the intent of regional planning can be made in utopian and non-utopian terms, and they would look similar, albeit only rhetorically. In a utopian sense, regional planning tries to eliminate regional differences by intending to eliminate the exploitative nature of dominant metropolises which drain all sources of wealth and culture of other regions. The elimination of metropolitan exploitation, again in the utopian sense, is possible by decentralizing the means of production as well as the population which gathers in the dominant metropolises and their hinterlands. The Garden City was intended to provide for this civic objective. It was argued that decentralization as such would create socially and culturally integrated self-contained regions. In the non-utopian sense, 'regional planning was intended to reduce, and in the long run eliminate, major inequalities of income among regions' (Friedmann and Weaver, 1977, 2). However, this time, decentralization is not really intended. Only the redistribution of income is suggested. Or even if it is intended, it would not be possible to achieve decentralization, for the metropolitan reality 'is not transcended'.

Nevertheless, both utopian and non-utopian elements influence the evolution of the regional planning doctrine. The utopian elements can be traced back to Proudhon (1970; 1979, cited in Friedmann, 1987). Two central concepts in Proudhon's works are 'mutualism' and 'federation'. Mutualism was to balance the 'eternal contradictions of economic life, without the loss of liberty', and this
would be possible through the workers who 'exercise their absolute right to the means of production (resources and technology), owning their own work place and tools' (Weaver, 1984, 41). The founding principle of a federation, on the other hand, is the concept of 'renegotiable social contracts'. These contracts would not only bring the 'natural (functional) units' (which can be identified as work or living groups) together to form production units and communes (which can be defined as functional and territorial groupings), but also would bring together these functional and territorial groupings to form regions:

Regional units defined by economic production and culture would be the largest building blocks of the social republic. These regions would provide all the prerequisites for a rounded development of human social, economic, and cultural capacities, in an environment free from political and economic coercion (Weaver, 1984, 42).

Thus, the concept of federation was to be carried into all facets of life, but this was possible only through mutualism, or, using Kropotkin's term, 'mutual aid' (Kropotkin, 1902, cited in Weaver, 1984, 44).

In the early years of regional planning in the United States, which roughly corresponds to the time when the Regional Planning Association of America was founded, these utopian inclinations were in the agenda. An amalgam of thoughts (which brought together the ideas and concepts of Patrick Geddes, Peter Kropotkin, Elisee Reclus, the regional geographers Paul Vidal de Blanque and Jean Brunhes, and Frederich Le Play as well as the anarchist Proudhon) was informing the RPAA. Thus, when the opportunity came (Tennessee Valley Authority), 'the utopians held out hopes that the Valley might become the cradle of a new civilization', but the experiment proved them wrong and it 'simply became an extension, under State auspices, of monopoly capitalism' (Friedmann and Weaver, 1977, 7). The most conspicuous non-utopian element, the State, turned the Valley into 'another part of growing America' (1977, 7).

The idea and hope of creating self-containing regions through regional planning did not end with the TVA. Non-utopian elements continued to inform the regional planning doctrine. With the advent of regional science, which can be identified with the works of, to name a few, Walter Isard (Location Theory), Gunnar Myrdal (Theory of Economic Development), John Friedmann (Theory of Urban Spatial Systems), and Douglas North (Theory of Export Based Regional Growth), regional planning became an established profession dealing with a complex set of issues (Friedmann, 1987). Natural resources development (which deals with irrigation, hydro-energy, integrated river basin development); regional economic development (which deals with inter-regional inequalities, special problem areas, urban areas, urban-rural imbalance); migration and settlement policy; location of industry (which deals with growth centers); regional transportation, and comprehensive rural development are all practiced as special branches of regional planning.

As we are approaching the end of the twentieth century, however, new utopian elements once again seem to inform the theory and practice of planning (Nozick, 1974, Friedmann and Weaver, 1977; Friedmann, 1979; Weaver, 1984; Friedmann, 1987), as if utopian and non-utopian sensibilities historically complement one another, although they initially clash with each other.
CONCLUSION

Mannheim explains the relationship of utopian and non-utopian sensibilities as follows:

The relationship between utopia and the existing order turns out to be a ‘dialectical’ one. By this is meant that every age allows to arise (in differently located social groups) those ideas and values in which are contained in condensed form the unrealized and the unfulfilled tendencies which represent the needs of each age. These intellectual elements then become the explosive material for bursting the limits of the existing order. The existing order gives birth to utopias which in turn break the bonds of the existing order, leaving it free to develop in the direction of the next order of existence (Mannheim, 1960, 179).

and continues by quoting Droysen:

All movement in the historical world goes on this way: Thought, which is the ideal counterpart of things as they really exist, develops itself as things ought to be (Droysen, 1893, 45-46).

Yet, planning theory and practice, as they are, seem to help preserve the status quo and thus manifest a non-dynamic structure. It can be said that a shift and a change in the domain of planning theory and practice is necessary, if the status quo is to be changed. Some suggest that this is possible through radical planning, the structure of which is dynamic and everchanging due to rising events (Friedmann, 1987).

Although there exist utopian sensibilities in the evolution of planning, they are not sufficient to transcend the realities of the existing order. The link between theory (which is continuously fed by utopian thoughts) and practice in planning seems to lack those qualities which can carry us to the utopian end, even though an examination of the historical evolution of planning suggests continuous waves of utopian and non-utopian sensibilities both in theory and in practice.

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PLANLAMA: ÜTOPIK VE ÜTOPIK OLMAYAN ANLAYIŞLARIN SÜREKLİLİĞİ

ÖZET

Ütopya teriminin tanımı konusunda farklı ve karşıt görüşler olduğu gibi, planlama ve ütopyanın birbirleri ile olan ilgileri konusunun açıklamaya çalışan farklı yaklaşımlar da bulunmaktadır. Bu yazı ütopya ile planlanmanın ne tür bir iliki içinde olduğunu anlatacak, böylelikle ütopyanın, planlanmanın ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bunu yaparken ütopyanın tanımlı konusunca bir görüş birliği olması gerektiği de vurgulanmaktadır.

Her hangi bir eser ya da çalışmanın bir ütopya olup olmadığını anlaşılabilirmesi, o eserin biçim (form), işlev (function) ve içerik (content) yönlerinin incelenmesi ile olanaklidir (Levitas 1990). Dolayısı ile bu üç yönün teker teker tanımlanması ütopyanın tanımını olması kilmaktadır. Kısaca bir ütopya birey ya da toplumun tümünün mutluluğu ve refahı için ortaya konan, varolan düzenin dışında bir düzen oluşturma özlem ve arzusunun bir söylem biçimine dönüştürülmesi şeklinde tanımlanabilir. Yani var olan düzenden kaynaklanan bir hoşnutsuzluk ütopayı doğurur.

Bunun yanında, var olan düzenin aksaklıklarının düzeltilmesi için yine aynı düzen içinde bir takım iyileştirici girişimlerde de bulunabilir. İşte planlama, hem varolan düzeni kökten değiştirmeye yönelik ütopyaları, hem de iyileştirici bir sonucu değişe bile bir amalı gibi biçiminde ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Kent ve bölge planlamasının birer disiplin olarak belirmesi ve kuramsal çerçevelerinin ilk olarak ortaya konması böyle bir senteze bağılmak, aynı disiplinler içinde farklı kuramlar geliştmesi ve pratigin buna göre değişmesi de yine aynı olgu ile açıklanabilir. Yani var olan düzenden hoşnutsuzluk sonucu ortaya konan özlömler (ütopyalar) herhangi bir için oluş.PIPE發表文はDISCUSS朝すがDINSEKTTHMNE//ONNESESTETE //HMMH//SSTN  DEŞIŞER. Planlanmanın kuram ve pratikteki önemeği böyle bir devamlılık içeren bir süreci açıklarken hem planlanmanın, hem de ütopyanın mekandaki bağımsız olamayışları da aralarındaki ilişkiye belirler niteliktedir.