With the organization of the First International Conference on Design and Emotion held by Delft University of Technology in 1999 and the foundation of Design and Emotion Society in the same year, “design and emotion” was announced as a new design movement and a specific field of design research. As people can not be stripped of their emotions, and material objects have always been created and used with emotional investment, studies addressing relationships between people and objects have always been interested in emotions, though they might not have employed the term ‘emotion’ (see for example, Attfield, 2000; Bourdieu, 1984; Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Dittmar, 1992; Jaritz, 2003; Miller, 2001). Additionally, focus on emotions has never been beyond the scope of design practice. Hence, design and emotion movement is a novel effort in design research and practice not in the sense of launching a brand new concern with emotions, but rather in terms of formulating its particular way of dealing with emotions (Yagou, 2006).

How do recent design discourses address emotions? How does the “design and emotion” field reflect on emotional relationships with objects? The prevailing tendency, based on cognitive-functionalist approaches, is to consider emotions as outcomes of the match or mismatch between personal concerns and the product stimuli (Desmet and Hekkert, 2002). Stressing that products evoke emotions and claiming that “designers can influence the emotions elicited by their designs” (Desmet, 2004a, 8), design and emotion research is meant to inform design practice about how to make emotion a motivating influence (Desmet et al., 2001). Experience or emotion driven design, therefore, focuses on close interactions between people and products in order to “make user experience the source of inspiration and ideation for design” (Sanders & Dandavate, 1999, 89).

Accordingly, design and emotion research is expected to draw conclusions as to intimate relationships people build with their objects. However, most design studies concerning with emotions concentrate merely on products,
with a tendency to regard emotion “as a direct result of the attributes of objects, situations or designs, or more unhelpfully, as actual attributes of objects, situations or designs” (Love, 2004). As such, the idea that products evoke emotions is often translated into efforts on “designing emotions” (Desmet, 2002) or “incorporating emotional value into products” (Chang and Yu-Wu, 2004).

Emotions experienced with material objects can not be ascribed to the person or to the object alone. Neither does the relationship between people and material objects is simply an interaction between two separate and isolated bodies. Emotions, rather, point out the very relationality between people and objects, which implies “intertwining and entangled identities of persons and the things they make, exchange, use and consume” (Tilley, 2006, 9). Nevertheless, theoretical frameworks and methodologies employed in design and emotion studies are often intended for “measuring emotion” (Desmet, 2004b), reducing such a complex relationality to a spontaneous impression of the person about pleasantness or unpleasantness of the object (1).

Viewpoints of design and emotion research is limited, not only for addressing people and objects as two distinct attributes of a relationship, but also for regarding concerns of people as merely personal constructions (e.g. Desmet and Hekkert, 2002) and for situating objects solely within their designed contexts and meanings. In this respect, design and emotion studies have the same problem with approaches of cognitive psychology they draw on, proposing over-individualized models and neglecting social and material structures (Sampson, 1981) in and by which both people and objects are inscribed. Neither people are simply free-floating, liking or disliking subjects in their relationships with objects, nor are objects basically pleasing or unpleasing materials. Emotions are not some unmediated personal constructions stripped of conditions of existence, but rather are socially constructed (Williams and Bendelow, 1998).

Moreover, as objects too have social lives (Appadurai, 1986), they can not be thought isolated from social, cultural and material processes by which they are created, used, circulated and attained meanings.

Because of these limitations, current design and emotion studies overlook the differences in emotional relationships with objects which can be mapped onto dissimilar social and material conditions of existence. Presuming that “although emotions are idiosyncratic, the conditions that underlie and elicit them are universal” (Desmet, 2004a), such studies fail to ask, firstly, if all individuals or groups are equally susceptible to crediting objects with emotions. Is thinking objects in the context of emotions equally valid and significant for all different groups? And, if it is, do the language employed and methodologies formulated in current design and emotion studies embrace varied forms of emotional relationships with objects? Does everybody, for example, describe their relationships with objects by employing “emotion words” such as fun, surprise, boredom, fear, fascination, and so on? To be more accurate, is “design and emotion” movement which bases itself on a divorce between function and emotion helpful in arguing for actual emotions experienced with objects that are largely shaped by social and material conditions of existence?

This paper attempts to discuss those questions with regard to the role of economic resources in emotional relationships with objects. It is an effort to introduce the question of economic means into debates on “design and emotion”, as it has a critical role in relationships with the

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1. See, for example, Desmet (2004b) for the “Product Emotion Measurement tool” (PrEmo Cards) designed as an instrument to measure pleasant and unpleasant emotions elicited by products.
world of material objects. Based on individual interviews, I will first trace the meaning and the way of crediting objects with emotions among economically deprived people, i.e. people living on low amounts of disposable income, in comparison with the economically privileged ones. Following this discussion of the roles of economic means in emotional experiences with objects, I will attempt to evaluate the current design and emotion movement with regard to the varied ways of forging emotional relationships with objects.

THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC MEANS IN RELATIONSHIPS WITH OBJECTS

To argue for the critical role of economic means in relationships with objects does not mean to confine taste and aesthetics of everyday life to the question of ability to afford, but rather to address how attitudes towards and concerns with objects are shaped by material conditions of existence. In other words, economic means have a decisive role in relationships with material objects, not simply because it determines power to purchase, but more significantly because it shapes tastes and life-styles. It should be admitted that with the question of affordability it introduces, economic means operate much powerfully in the everyday lives of economically deprived people. As Lehtonen (1999) argues, when economic resources set limits, shopping experience “is not a question of a free-floating construction of subjectivity but rather of a socially conditioned activity.” (Lehtonen, 1999, 258). However, as Bourdieu (1984) suggests, the idea that tastes and aesthetic dispositions are products of material conditions of existence applies both to the economically deprived and privileged groups, though it is mostly unnoticed for the latter due to their distance from the world of economic necessities.

The differences between economically deprived and privileged people in their relationships with material objects can be basically explained with their varied attitudes towards the world of necessities. Empirical studies on the role of economic resources in concerns with objects have long indicated that economically deprived people tend to appreciate objects for fulfillment of necessities whereas privileged ones mostly stress symbolic values of objects such as their power to embody memories (see e.g. Coleman, 1983; Dittmar, 1992).

Veblen (1957) and Bourdieu (1984) pointedly discuss attitudes towards the necessity in the context of social differentiation. For Veblen (1957), utilizing consumption to attain social esteem, what he describes as “conspicuous consumption”, is achieved by “unproductive consumption of goods”, that is, by removal from necessities of subsistence. Offering a vivid analysis of the relationship between economic capital and aesthetic dispositions, Bourdieu (1984), similarly, points to the crucial role of economic power in attaining a distanced attitude towards objects, which implies detachment from the world of necessities. As such, he argues, economic capital is one of the vital factors that align individuals and groups with either of the two oppositional categories of taste:

“The true basis of the differences found in consumption, and far beyond it, is the opposition between the taste of luxury (or freedom) and the tastes of necessity. The former are the tastes of individuals who are the product of material conditions of existence defined by distance from necessity, by the freedoms or facilities stemming from possession of capital; the latter express, precisely in their adjustment, the necessities of which they are the product.” (Bourdieu, 1984, 177)
Addressing preference for the necessary as a matter of taste, Bourdieu (1984) shows that the emphasis on necessities, among working classes for example, can not be simply explained with the lack of ability to afford. The tastes of necessity are the choices of habitus which is a product of the social and material conditions of existence:

“Although working-class practices may seem to be deduced directly from their economic conditions, ... they stem from a choice of the necessary ...; both in the sense of what is technically necessary, ‘practical’ ...; and of what is imposed by an economic and social necessity condemning ‘simple’, ‘modest’ people to ‘simple’, ‘modest’ tastes.” (Bourdieu, 1984, 379)

To sum up, Bourdieu’s consideration of tastes and aesthetic preferences as products of social and material conditions of existence offers two influential insights for the purposes of this paper. First, preferences for and judgments on objects are not some ‘naturally’ possessed or individually articulated dispositions with an utter freedom of choice, but rather are products of the conditions of existence. Second, economic resources is not simply and merely a question of means of acquisition, but is crucial in determining one’s preferences and aesthetic judgments, such as attitudes towards the necessities.

Are emotional relationships with objects as well shaped by material conditions of existence? How do economic means affect emotional responses towards objects? Do, for example, attitudes towards the necessity play a role in emotional experiences with objects? Can we affirm “emotions for the necessary” comparable to “tastes of necessity”?

ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND EMOTIONS FOR OBJECTS

The following discussion on the role of economic means in emotional relationships with objects is based on individual interviews carried out among two different income groups, i.e. a low income group and high income group. During interviews, participants were asked to identify one particular object with which they may credit an emotional attachment and one other to which they feel aloof. Asking questions about the relationships they built with those objects, I tried to grasp their emotional experiences with the world of material objects (2).

The first striking difference between high income group and low income group relates to the appraisal of material objects in the context of emotions. When I asked them to identify an object to which they feel emotionally attached, economically privileged informants responded easily and enthusiastically. They often mentioned more than one object, explained their relationships with them in detail, and sometimes told stories and showed photos that involve those objects. In some cases, it was obvious that they have already thought before about their emotional engagement with those particular objects.

“My kettle. I spend most of my time at home and like drinking tea and coffee. I use my kettle during the whole day, since 12 years. When I am alone, I see it as a friend. In a way it reflects my life-style. I’m not exaggerating. We have a very good relationship! Also, I like its look. It’s quite enjoyable. ... I take it with me even while traveling. When I was younger and living with my parents, I put it in my room in order not to leave my room for making tea or coffee. That was a sort of freedom.”

On the other hand, employing the word “emotion” or “emotion words” in relation to material objects was often unusual for economically deprived informants, if not irrelevant at all. They could hardly have imagined

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2. Those interviews were carried out as part of my MS. research addressing emotional attachment to and detachment from products. All interviews were carried out in Ankara, in the year 2001, and in Turkish language. During interviews, the word ‘işya’ was used to refer both to the ‘object’ and to the ‘product’. Both the low income and the high income group involved 18 participants each, of which nine is female and nine is male, with the ages ranging between 18 and 63. As the discussion of gender and age is beyond the scope of this paper, both groups are evaluated only as to the question of economic means.
objects they possess in the context of emotions, because a link between emotionality and material objects was unexpected and strange. My questions on emotional attachment were sometimes replied with a little anxiety, pointing out the strangeness of considering emotions for an object within their material conditions of life:

“I do not have anything to which I feel attached. Actually, I do not have anything except a washing machine. My house was on fire and everything was destroyed. But, my washing machine was in a service shop for repairs on that day.”

Given that low income informants had difficulty in relating objects to emotions, can we comfortably assume that emotional engagement with objects is more relevant to people in economically privileged positions? Such a difference in appraisal of objects in the context of emotions cannot be easily concluded as to the intensity of emotions, because it cannot be addressed without taking into account differences in languages employed to describe objects. That economically deprived informants hardly mentioned the word emotion or emotion words in describing their relationships with objects does not imply a lack of an emotional experience or a weak emotional attachment. Indeed, when I asked questions such as “which one of your objects do you like the most?, avoiding the term “emotion”, and tried to understand their relationship with the object through more explicit questions such as “how and why did you buy it?”, they started to comment on their objects, manifesting their emotional responses.

For example, the woman who rescued her washing machine from the fire expressed a very strong emotional relationship with it, even though she found emotions to objects a strange idea. Since she started to live with her daughter’s family after the fire, her washing machine was not being used at the time of interview. It was placed in the hall and decorated with a lace and some ornaments, waiting to be used again when she can afford making a new home. As the only concrete object remained from her past and continues to live with her, it connects her to the past on the one hand and is involved in her future projected home on the other:

“Can you imagine? Only we (her and the washing machine) were out that day, and only two of us survived. I hope I can afford a home in the future and use my washing machine again.”

Similar to tastes and aesthetic judgments, emotional relationships with objects as well relate to the question of economic means primarily in terms of attitudes towards necessities. Economically deprived informants mostly cherished objects that satisfy some specific needs and highlighted utilities they provide. Emotional attachments to objects were typically explained with clear-cut phrases such as “it satisfies a very important need” or “it is an important necessity”. Such a tendency to favor necessities in relationships with objects is exceptionally evident in cases of emotional attachments credited to objects on which livelihood depends. A shoe dying box and a drill mentioned as the most worthy objects exemplify how economically deprived people consider emotions towards objects first and foremost in terms of fulfillment of necessities:

“I earn my money through this shoe dying box. So I feel attached to it.”

“I need this drill. It does not matter if I like it or not. I work with it. It’s the most valuable object I have.”

The main difference between the two income groups on attitudes towards necessities does not relate to the categories of objects credited with
emotions, but rather pertains to importance given to satisfaction of needs. Informants possessing high amounts of income as well valued objects that are acquired with the purpose of fulfilling certain needs. For example, washing machines were the most popular objects credited with emotional attachment by both economically privileged and deprived women. However, emotional value that economically privileged women ascribed to their washing machines concerned less with the satisfaction of a need than with appreciation of style, brand image and aesthetic gratification:

“I didn’t like my previous washing machine as much as I like this one. The old one seemed too simple to me. I don’t know; it didn’t look like something technological. But the new one… It looks smart; it’s nicer. I enjoy its appearance in my bathroom.”

On the other hand, none of the economically deprived women commented on aesthetics of washing machines they value. What they cherished is to possess a washing machine, rather than qualities of the particular one they have. With an awareness of that they could afford a washing machine, they derive contentment and enjoyment through cleaning clothes easily:

“Every time I wash clothes, I feel happy and accomplished something. I remember days we didn’t have a washing machine. My children were too young. Lots of dirty clothes... It was very difficult. I feel attached to it, because I can’t imagine what I would do without this washing machine.”

Likewise, quality, durability and functional performance of objects were stressed by both groups, but appreciated for different reasons. An economically privileged informant, for example, credited his armchairs with emotional attachment for their durability: “We bought them when we got married. We carried them everywhere that we moved during 20 years. They have never broken down. They are still robust. Our armchairs are still with us like a monument.” Dissociating it from the necessities, he admires durability for it allows him to retain armchairs that embody his memories. His emotions towards the armchairs correspond to the idea of Bourdieu (1984) that the assurance on obtaining necessities creates a distanced attitude towards the world of objects. On the other hand, an economically deprived informant told that he hates his cupboard due to its flimsiness: “It is of a very poor quality. I bought it only three months ago and it broke down. I can’t buy a new one. I wish I had never bought it. I hate it.” Once he bought a cupboard, he wants it to endure for a long time, because he can not afford to replace it. For him, durability of an object is mainly important for the satisfaction of his needs, unlike the high income informant’s distanced attitude to robustness of the armchairs.

In short, for economically deprived informants, appraisal of objects in the context of emotions first and foremost relates to satisfaction of needs. Objects that are endowed with emotional attachment are the ones which provide important utilities and satisfy definite necessities. On the other hand, economically privileged informants tend to dissociate emotions from the world of necessities not so much through the categories of objects they credit for emotions but by their distanced attitude towards functions of objects. What Bourdieu (1984) argues with regard to diversities in tastes and aesthetic judgments applies to emotional relationships with objects as well. That is, differences in obtaining necessities create diversities in meanings and ways of forging emotional relationships with objects. Drawing on the term “tastes of the necessary” that Bourdieu coined, it can be argued that economically deprived people develop “emotions for the necessary”.
It is important to note that emphasis on necessities among economically deprived people does not imply that they only buy and value objects they “really” need. Besides, it is fruitless to ask if a particular object is a “fundamental” necessity or not, as there can not be a clear-cut division between necessities and luxuries (Douglas and Isherwood, 1996) and needs are indeed created by the system of production (Baudrillard, 1998). The focus on necessities among economically deprived people refers to a particular idea on material objects rather than the truth of actual practices. For example, one of the informants living on a low income valued his mobile phone since “it’s an important need; it enables communication”. Yet, he later explained that he usually keeps it off, because he can not afford the bills: “I don’t use it much, since it costs too much for me. But, I like carrying it with me”. When the symbolic power of having a mobile phone for an upward social mobility among certain groups is considered, it is not surprising that one can feel attached to a mobile phone which is not actually used. What is striking is rather the explanation of such an emotional attachment with the satisfaction of the need for communication.

It is obvious that economically deprived people employ a language on material objects which privileges necessities and utilities. This language emerges from a particular narrative which constitutes the self and portrays it to others (Giddens, 1991), established on relating material objects first and foremost to the context of necessities. If privileging necessities is a matter of taste and narrative on objects, we can not comfortably assume a hierarchical relationship between satisfaction of needs and seeking for pleasure, as Jordan (2000) assumes. Applying Maslow’s (1943) theory of “hierarchy of needs” to human factors, he argues that once the need for functionality is fulfilled, people seek for usability in products and having become accustomed to usability, they expect “products that offer something extra; products that are not merely tools but “living objects” that people can relate to; products that bring not only functional benefits but also emotional ones” (Jordan, 2000, 6).

On the contrary, emotions can not be simply thought as separate from and subsequent to functionality, utility and usability, but rather might be derived from an object’s capacity to fulfill necessities, particularly among people in an economically deprived position.

To sum up, “emotions for the necessary” pertains to a narrative on necessity that economically deprived people construct and employ in their relationships with the world of material objects. Is, then, such an emotional relationship with objects which employs a narrative on necessity compatible with the way ‘design and emotion’ deals with emotions for products? In other words, do current approaches of ‘design and emotion’ embrace those “emotions for the necessary”?

‘DESIGN AND EMOTION’:
DIVORCE BETWEEN FUNCTION AND EMOTION

Overbeeke and Hekkert (1999) write in the Editorial of the Proceedings of the First International Conference on Design and Emotion that:

“Many industries have started to launch their products as emotion carriers, containers or generators. They have realized that mere functionality does no longer sell. Not only are costumers not interested in the 54th new function, many products have reached a level of technical perfection that it has become difficult to discriminate on that basis. Thus, when two coffee
makers basically make the same pot of coffee, we take the one that gives us a pleasant, desirable, or inspired feeling.” (Overbeeke and Hekkert, 1999, 5)

This argument is the most powerful assumption on which design and emotion movement is based. It is argued that since all products achieved a perfect level of functional performance, functionality or utility no longer satisfies people’s expectations from products. The starting point of most of the design studies addressing emotions is the idea that in their relationships with objects, people no more seek functionality, utility, usability, and so on, but rather demand “emotional benefits” such as pleasure and enjoyment (see for example, Chang and Yu-Wu, 2004; Funke, 1999; Norman, 2004; Porter et al., 2004; Suri, 2004). For example, Funke (1999) writes:

“What was once a luxury available only to a small social upper class has, in industrial society become a principle of life shared by all. “Arrange your situation in the way you like it!” —the aim of having a pleasant life, i.e., of having pleasant experiences, has in large areas of everyday life replaced the aim of having a secure life, i.e., of surviving. The value of the experience is put above the utility value of objects, of the services, and even of nature.” (Funke, 1999, 35)

These presumptions firstly raise the question for whom design and emotion movement is intended. For whom the life is so secure that pursuing enjoyment becomes the main goal? Who does not concern with utilities of material objects any more and seek pleasure instead? It can be argued that for people who feel secure about affording necessities, utility of objects might no longer be a source of positive emotions. However, as the discussion above shows, economically deprived people, considering emotional relationship with objects in the context of satisfaction of necessities, still derive pleasure, confidence and happiness from an object which offers “only” utility.

Moreover, when the range of products affordable for economically deprived people is taken into consideration, it is quite suspicious that all products reached to a point of technical perfection. Those people still suffer from weak functional performance and short enduring time of products. Even if they are confronted with choosing from a variety of products with similar functional qualities, they prefer the cheaper one rather than the one which supposedly offers joy, fun and pleasure, not merely because they can not afford an extra pleasure other than utility, but also because they inhabit a taste and a morality which privileges thrift.

Considering emotion as subsequent to the assurance of functionality and utility, design and emotion discourses frame emotions as separate from, or more unhelpfully, in opposition to satisfaction of needs. In this way, design and emotion studies seem to move towards inscribing a new duality onto products: emotion vs. function. At the basis of this duality lies not only addressing emotion as just another product attribute, i.e. form, function, usability, plus emotion, but also dismissing utility from pleasurability of the product. For example, Jordan (2000) straightforwardly distinguishes two different benefits that products offer:

“Practical benefits are those that accrue from the outcomes of tasks for which the product is used. … Meanwhile, a washing machine, for example, delivers the practical benefit of clean, fresh clothes. Emotional benefits are those pertaining to how a product affects a person’s mood. Using a product might be, for example, exciting, interesting, fun, satisfying or confidence enhancing.” (Jordan, 2000, 12)
How can emotions be clearly distinguished from ‘practical benefits’? If one’s economic resources do not assure having a washing machine, is not merely being able to wash clothes easily an enjoyable and pleasurable experience ascribed to the washing machine? Dissociating pleurability of objects from fulfillment of necessities, design and emotion movement utterly operates within the ideology of consumption by which “pleasure ceased to be about the satisfaction of needs and became an ideal experience to be pursued for its own sake.” (Patlar and Kurtgözü, 2004).

To come to the point, at the basis of declaring and justifying interest in emotions in design lies a divorce between function and emotion. Proposing that “designers should create products that are not only useful, but also enjoyable (Schifferstein et al., 2004), design and emotion movement dissociates itself from the world of necessities. Although “instrumental emotions” are sometimes addressed as a category of “product emotions” (Desmet, 2004c), concentrated efforts “to evoke sensory and aesthetic pleasure” (Schifferstein et al., 2004) and methodologies formulated for determining instant responses evoked by “seeing” or “seeing and feeling” (Ludden et al., 2004) show that ‘design and emotion’ movement regards them as less intense or negligible emotions, if not irrelevant at all. Is emotional attachment to a shoe dying box for it provides livelihood less important than surprises elicited by perfume bottles?

In that case, emotional contentment derived from an object’s capacity to accomplish a task rather than from its extra attributes designed for pleasure is not covered in “design and emotion” research. In other words, ‘design and emotion’ movement excludes emotions for the necessary. Its discourses and methodologies do not embrace emotions of those who build their relationships with the world of material objects on a narrative on necessity. Excluding emotions for the necessary, design and emotion movement raises another significant question: Do differences in emotional relationships with objects reflect and reproduce social differentiation in the same way as diversities in tastes? Opposition between “the tastes of luxury” and “the tastes of necessary” Bourdieu (1984) argues, is one of the crucial factors in creating social distinction:

“The basic opposition between the tastes of luxury and the tastes of necessity is specified in as many oppositions as there are different ways of asserting one’s distinction vis-à-vis the working class and its primary needs, or -which amounts to the same thing- different powers whereby necessity can be kept at a distance.” (Bourdieu, 1984, 184)

By dissociating emotion from function or utility, design and emotion movement introduces one of those oppositions to be employed for affirming distance from the world of necessities. Regarding emotion as a designed quality and offering products to the market with the label ‘emotion’, it reduces intimate emotional relationships with objects to a question of consumption preference, i.e. whether to buy an emotionally valuable product or not. In this way, ‘design and emotion’ seems to transform emotions towards objects into a sign which can be employed as a means of achieving social differentiation. Furthermore, as Kurtgözü (2003) argues, attempting to add an “emotional capacity” to products, “design and emotion’ runs the risk of becoming a fashionable style, a catchword employed by advertising for the marketing of luxury products to an elite culture” (Kurtgözü, 2003).

I believe that the major strength of addressing emotions in design research lies in its capacity to move beyond dichotomies in design theory. Arguing
that “emotions lie at the juncture of a number of fundamental dualisms in western thought” (Williams and Bendelow, 1998). Williams and Bendelow (1998) ascribe a particular importance to the study of emotions in efforts on transcending former dichotomous ways of thinking. Following this idea on emotions, it can be argued that study of emotions for objects have a capacity to traverse and negotiate boundaries and dualities constructed between form and function, utility and pleasure, and so on. Furthermore, a focus on emotions in design studies has the potential of challenging consideration of people and objects as two isolated entities and the relationship between them as a simple interaction between object attributes and personal concerns. Whether they are derived from a demand for necessities or a concern with embodied memories, emotions indicate the relationality between people and objects which is often overlooked in design and emotion studies.

Instead of attempting to rationalize the person-object relationship (Kaygan, 2004) and inhabiting and furthering dichotomies built on objects, design and emotion movement should utilize the potential of a focus on emotions in understanding the richness and complexity of both objects and relationships with them. If ‘design and emotion’ movement is not simply indented for marketing reasons, but aims at contributing to experiences of people with objects, as claimed by Overbeeke and Hekkert (1999), it should focus on the actual emotional relationships between people and objects, which are largely shaped by the social and material conditions of existence.

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GEREKLİLİĞE DAİR DUYGULAR

Emotional relationships with material objects can not be thought as isolated from social and material conditions of existence. This paper is an attempt to introduce the question of economic means into debates on “design and emotion”. It firstly addresses the role of economic means in crediting objects with emotions and subsequently evaluates approaches of ‘design and emotion’ with regard to varied meanings and ways of forging emotional relationships with objects, which is largely shaped by material conditions of existence. Based on individual interviews, it was found that economically deprived people tend to articulate “emotions for the necessary” through a narrative on material objects which privileges necessities. Yet, ‘design and emotion’ movement, basing itself on a divorce between function and emotion and dissociating emotions from the world of necessities, excludes those emotions for the necessary.